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How the ETF Arbitrage Pricing Mechanism Works
By John Spence, Associate
Editor
Research indicates that most buy-and-hold investors are primarily
drawn to exchange-traded funds for their lower expense ratios and
potential tax efficiency. Most passive investors are not
interested in trading during the day, but the ability to do
so with ETFs sets them apart from mutual funds. Many industry observers
are rightly questioning if the arbitrage mechanism that keeps the
price of a domestic ETF share in line with the net asset value (NAV)
could temporarily break down in extreme market conditions.
First, let's look at how the ETF arbitrage mechanism works (it
may also be helpful to refer to this article).
Keep in mind that the whole system is designed to prevent market
makers from making unfair markets.
A passive ETF share is simply a basket of securities held in the
same proportion as in the index tracked. Market makers and specialists
must continually decide if they want to hold those securities in
packaged as an ETF share or loose - this process is called creation
and redemption.
The large institutions involved in ETF market making are constantly
monitoring the share prices of ETFs, and will arbitrage any differences
between share price and the NAV of the underlying portfolio. Since
the NAV of the underlying portfolio is updated every 15 seconds
throughout the trading day, this process can happen very quickly.
Let's take a look at a theoretical example of the arbitrage pricing
mechanism in action. Imagine a specialist, for example Hull Trading,
sets the ask price of an ETF share at $45, while the NAV of the
underlying portfolio is $46. Another specialist, perhaps Bear Hunter,
spots the opportunity and starts scooping up as many shares as possible.
Bear Hunter can then turn around and redeem the shares at $46. In
our hypothetical example, let's assume 1,000,000 shares were purchased
and subsequently redeemed. At a $1 profit per share, Hull Trading
has lost a million bucks and Bear Hunter is ahead by the same amount.
Institutions can also reverse the process if the ETF trades at a
premium to the NAV. Therein lies the incentive for making tight
markets in ETFs.
Due to the competition between specialists, the real measure of
an ETF's liquidity is the liquidity of the underlying stock. This
is what leads some industry observers to wonder how the arbitrage
pricing mechanism will react in extreme market situations, and it's
a fair question.
Setting international ETFs aside for the moment, how will domestic
ETFs react in a severe market crash? In particular, Lipper analyst
Don Cassidy has asked if institutional players might be unwilling
to risk capital on the long side to assemble creation units at true
underlying value when discounts arise. Others have harkened back
to the crash of 1987 when the tight relationship between futures
and stock prices came apart.
Lee Kranefuss, CEO of individual investor business at Barclays
Global Investors, says there's a big difference between the 1987
situation and ETFs. Institutions were unable to arbitrage the difference
between the cash and futures markets in 1987 when the markets were
in free fall because the cash market was trading, but the futures
market ceased trading at times. The system was built upon arbitrage
between the two markets, and when one broke down the whole system
unraveled. Kranefuss says ETFs are different because the arbitrage
takes place in the equities market.
"Applying intuition learned from other financial instruments
often leads to faulty conclusions when applied to ETFs," said
Kranefuss, who also noted that domestic ETFs were stress-tested
in the trading days following the incidents of 9/11 because significant
premiums and discounts did not materialize.
Kranefuss points out that crashes affect all vehicles, not just
ETFs.
"Market meltdowns don't serve any financial instrument well,"
said Kranefuss.
Therefore, says Kranefuss, concerns about ETF liquidity should
involve problems specific to ETFs and not novel concerns that affect
all financial instruments.
For example, ETF critics love to point to what happened to the
Malaysia iShares country basket when that country imposed capital
controls in 1998. The ETF was unable to honor redemption of creation
units in currency other than Malaysian ringgits, and significant
discounts opened up. Kranefuss argues that all instruments and not
just ETFs were aversely affected by the situation, and in any case
the ETF did allow trading and price discovery despite the discount.
The evidence so far shows that domestic ETFs, in particular those
tied to liquid indexes, have tracked their benchmarks closely
so far. How they will react in a market crash is more important
for investors who like the reassurance of being able to get in and
out of markets during the day. However, ETF managers and proponents
have touted this benefit and should therefore deliver on it. In
reality though, most skeptics won't be truly convinced until the
arbitrage pricing mechanism holds up through a serious crash. Although
I'm as curious as anyone, here's to hoping we never find out.
The bottom line is that investors need to understand how and why
premiums and discounts arise, especially as more ETFs come to market.
Although the SEC recently gave initial approval
for fixed-income ETFs, one its major concerns was potential premiums
and discounts in the products. The SEC and others have voiced similar
concerns with regard to the possibility of upcoming actively managed
ETFs. Finally, some analysts have pointed out that repetitive ETFs
tracking similar market segments could reduce liquidity and increase
tracking error.
06/03/2002
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